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Abstract
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain in-
centive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those
who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it has been shown to im-
pose some limitations, e.g., no OSP mechanism can return a stable matching [Ashlagi and
Gonczarowski, 2015].
We here deepen the study of the limitations of OSP mechanisms by looking at their
approximation guarantees for basic optimization problems paradigmatic of the area, i.e.,
machine scheduling and facility location. We prove a number of bounds on the approxima-
tion guarantee of OSP mechanisms, which show that OSP can come at a significant cost.
However, rather surprisingly, we prove that OSP mechanisms can return optimal solutions
when they use monitoring — a novel mechanism design paradigm that introduces a mild
level of scrutiny on agents’ declarations [Kova´cs et al., 2015].
1 Introduction
Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD) is by now an established research area in computer
science that aims at conceiving algorithms resistant to selfish manipulations. As the number
of parties (a.k.a., agents) involved in the computation increases, there is, in fact, the need to
realign their individual interests with the designer’s. Truthfulness is the chief concept to achieve
that: in a truthful mechanism, no selfish and rational agent has an interest to misguide the
mechanism. A valid question of recent interest is, however, how easy it is for the selfish agents to
understand that it is useless (and possibly costly) to strategize against the truthful mechanism
at hand.
Recent research has come up with different approaches to deal with this question. Some
authors [Sandholm and Gilpin, 2003, Chawla et al., 2010, Babaioff et al., 2014, Adamczyk
et al., 2015] suggest to focus on “simple” mechanisms; e.g., in posted-price mechanisms one’s
own bid is immaterial for the price paid to get some goods of interest – this should immediately
suggest that trying to play the mechanism is worthless no matter the cognitive abilities of the
agents. However, in such a body of work, this property remains unsatisfactorily vague. An
orthogonal approach is that of verifiably truthful mechanisms [Braˆnzei and Procaccia, 2015],
wherein agents can run some algorithm to effectively check that the mechanism is incentive
compatible. Nevertheless, these verification algorithms can run for long (i.e., time exponential
in the input size) and are so far known only for quite limited scenarios. Importantly, moreover,
they seem to transfer the question from the mechanism itself to the verification algorithm.
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Li [2015] has recently formalized the aforementioned idea of simple mechanisms, by intro-
ducing the concept of Obviously Strategy-Proof (OSP) mechanisms. This notion stems from the
observation that the very same mechanism can be more or less truthful in practice depending
on the implementation details. For example, in lab experiments, Vickrey’s famous second-price
mechanism results to be “less” truthful when implemented via a sealed-bid auction, and “more”
truthful when run via an ascending auction. The quite technical definition of OSP formally cap-
tures how implementation details matter by looking at a mechanism as an extensive-form game;
roughly speaking, OSP demands that strategyproofness holds among subtrees of the game (see
below for a formal definition). An important validation for the ‘obviousness’ is further provided
by Li [2015] via a characterization of these mechanisms in terms of agents with limited cognitive
abilities (i.e., agents with limited skills in contingent reasoning). Specifically, Li shows that a
strategy is obviously dominant if and only if these “limited” agents can recognize it as such.
OSP is consequently a very appealing notion as in many cases rationality has been seen as the
main obstacle to concrete applications of mechanism design paradigms, cf. e.g. [Ferraioli et al.,
2015]; such a relaxation might be a panacea in these cases.
Nevertheless, for all its significant aspects, there appear to be hints that the notion of OSP
mechanisms might be too restrictive. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski [2015] prove, for example,
that no OSP mechanism can return a stable matching – thus implying that the Gale-Shapley
matching algorithm is not OSP despite its apparent simplicity.
1.1 Our Contribution
We investigate the power of OSP mechanisms in more detail from a theoretical computer science
perspective. In particular, we want to understand the quality of approximate solutions that can
be output by OSP mechanisms. To answer this question, we focus on two fundamental opti-
mization problems, machine scheduling [Archer and Tardos, 2001] and facility location [Moulin,
1980], arguably (among) the paradigmatic problems in AMD.
For the former problem, we want to compute a schedule of jobs on selfish related machines
(i.e., machines with job-independent speeds) so to minimize the makespan. For this single-
dimensional problem, it is known that a truthful PTAS is possible [Christodoulou and Kova´cs,
2013]. In contrast, we show that there is no better than 2-approximate OSP mechanism for this
problem independently from the running time of the mechanism.
For the facility location problem, we want to determine the location of a facility on the
real line given the preferred locations of n agents. The objective is to minimize the social cost,
defined as the sum over the individual agents of the distances between their preferred location
and the facility’s. Moulin [1980] proves that the optimal mechanism, that places the facility on
the median of the reported locations, is truthful without money (i.e., the mechanism does not
pay or charge the agents). OSP mechanisms without money turn out to be much weaker than
that. We prove in fact a tight bound of n − 1. Interestingly, this bound can be shown also for
mechanisms that use money, thus showing that transfers are not useful at all to enforce OSP.
The proof of this fact uses a novel lower bounding technique for OSP mechanisms wherein the
bidding domain (or, equivalently the strategy set) of the lying agent does not necessarily have
size two (whereas, to the best of our knowledge, all previous impossibility results rely on this
assumption); we in fact show that it is enough to identify two particular values in the bidding
domain for our argument to work no matter the size of the domain.
However, a surprising connection of OSP mechanisms with a novel mechanism design para-
digm – called monitoring – allows us to prove strong positive results. Building upon the notion
of mechanisms with verification [Nisan and Ronen, 2001, Ventre, 2014, Penna and Ventre,
2014], Kova´cs et al. [2015] introduce the idea that a mechanism can check the declarations
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of the agents at running time and guarantee that those who overreported their costs end up
paying the exaggerated costs. This can be enforced whenever costs can be easily measured and
certified. For example, a mechanism can force a machine that in her declaration has augmented
her running time to work that long by keeping her idle for the difference between real and
reported running time.
We first prove that, no matter the algorithm at hand, there exists an OSP mechanism
with monitoring that always compensates the agents their costs. This first-price mechanism,
introduced in the context of mechanisms with monitoring by Serafino et al. [2017], yields a
couple of interesting observations in the context of OSP mechanisms. Firstly, it is the first
direct-revelation OSP mechanism. As such it does not need any assumption on the agents’
bidding domain nor to repeatdly query/interact with the agents. We remark that the known
constructions of Li [2015] typically need finite domains (or, slightly more generally, domains
admitting a finite partition). Secondly, the mechanism uses the algorithm at hand as a black
box thus reconciling approximation and obvious strategyproofness. This is relavant because,
even for truthful mechanism, it is known that, without monitoring, black box reduction to
a non-truthful algorithm may not exist [Dobzinski and Vondra´k, 2012]. This theorem can
then be applied to both our problems of interest, and prove the existence of optimal OSP
mechanisms with monitoring. Clearly, the optimal mechanism for machine scheduling runs in
exponential time; a PTAS that is OSP can however be obtained by plugging in the appropriate
approximation algorithm.
Nevertheless, as noted in related literature [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013], paying the
agents in facility location problems might not be feasible in certain contexts. We therefore look
at mechanisms that charge agents to use the facilities (e.g., via a subscription fee); note that,
as stated above, transfers ought to be used for good approximations. We design the interval
mechanism for facility location that is optimal, OSP with monitoring and charges (rather than
paying) the agents. This construction adapts the first-price mechanism in [Serafino et al., 2017]
to guarantee obvious strategyproofness even in absence of funds to pay the agents. We further
show that this simple adaptation can be cleverly modified to guarantee that agents are charged
as little as possible; we in fact prove that in general there is no OSP mechanism that is more
economical than that.
Our results for facility location draw an interesting parallel between OSP and truthful mech-
anisms. On one hand, our bounds for OSP mechanisms without money are in stark contrast with
the case of strategyproof mechanisms where the optimum is known to be truthful [Moulin, 1980].
On the other hand, our results for OSP mechanisms can be likened to truthful mechanisms for
K-facility location, K ≥ 2, where there is a linear gap between truthful approximations with
and without money [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013, Fotakis and Tzamos, 2014] (incidentally,
there are hints that the gap remains linear also for relaxed notions of truthfulness without
money [Ferraioli et al., 2016]) – in the case of OSP mechanisms the price to pay to close the
gap is not only money, but also monitoring.
2 Preliminaries
Mechanisms and Strategyproofness. In this work we consider a classical mechanism design
setting, in which we have a set of outcomes O and n selfish agents. Each agent i has a type
ti ∈ Di, where Di is defined as the domain of i. The type ti is private knowledge of agent i.
Moreover, each selfish agent i has a cost function ci : Di × O → R. For ti ∈ Di and X ∈ O,
ci(ti,X) is the cost paid by agent i to implement X when her type is ti.
A mechanism consists of a protocol whose goal is to determine an outcome X ∈ O. To
this aim, the mechanism is allowed to interact with agents. During this interaction, agent i
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is observed to take actions (e.g., saying yes/no); these actions may depend on her presumed
type bi ∈ Di that can be different from the real type ti (e.g., saying yes could “signal” that the
presumed type has some properties that bi alone might enjoy). We say that agent i takes actions
according to bi to stress this. For a mechanism M, we let M(b) denote the outcome returned
by the mechanism when agents take actions according to their presumed types b = (b1, . . . , bn).
Usually, this outcome is given by a pair (f,p), where f = f(b) (termed social choice function
or, simply, algorithm) maps the actions taken by the agents according to b to a feasible solution
for the problem at the hand (e.g., an allocation of jobs to machines that enjoys particular
properties), and p = p(b) = (p1(b), . . . , pn(b)) ∈ R
n maps the actions taken by the agents
according to b to payments from the mechanism to each agent i. Note that the pi’s can be
positive (meaning that the mechanism will pay the agents) or negative (meaning that the agents
will pay the mechanism).
A mechanisms is said without money if pi(b) = 0 for every agent i and every profile b ∈
D = D1 × · · · ×Dn. Our definitions below do naturally extend to this case by considering null
payments.
A mechanism M is strategy-proof if for every i, every b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) and
every bi ∈ Di, it holds that ci(ti,M(ti,b−i)) ≤ ci(ti,M(bi,b−i)), where ti is the true type
of i. That is, in a strategy-proof mechanism the actions taken according to the true type are
dominant for each agent.
Moreover, a mechanism M is said to satisfy voluntary participation if for every i and every
b−i, it holds that ci(ti,M(ti,b−i)) ≤ 0.
Obvious Strategyproofness. Let us now formally define the concept of obviously strategy-
proof mechanism. This concept has been introduced in [Li, 2015]. The original definition turns
out to be very general and, consequently, quite complex. For this reason, in this work we
follow Ashlagi and Gonczarowski [2015] and rephrase this definition for our setting of interest.
Note that we focus on deterministic mechanisms only.
We begin by formally modeling how a mechanism works and subsequently give some intuition
behind the mathematical definition. Specifically, we have that an extensive-form mechanism
M is defined by a directed tree T = (V,E) such that:
• every leaf ℓ of the tree is labeled by a possible outcome X(ℓ) ∈ O of the mechanism;
• every internal vertex u ∈ V is labeled by a subset S(u) ⊆ [n] of agents;
• every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E is labeled by a subset T (e) ⊆ D of type profiles such that:
– the subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from the same vertex u are
disjoint, i.e., for every triple of vertices u, v, v′ such that (u, v) ∈ E and (u, v′) ∈ E,
we have that T (u, v) ∩ T (u, v′) = ∅;
– the union of the subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from a non-root
vertex u is equal to the subset of profiles that label the edge going in u, i.e.,⋃
v : (u,v)∈E T (u, v) = T (φ(u), u), where φ(u) is the parent of u in T ;
– the union of the subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from the root vertex
r is equal to the set of all profiles, i.e.,
⋃
v : (r,v)∈E T (r, v) = D;
– for every u, v such that (u, v) ∈ E and for every two profiles b,b′ ∈ T (φ(u), u)
such that (bi)i∈S(u) = (b
′
i)i∈S(u), if b belongs to T (u, v), then also b
′ must belong to
T (u, v).
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Roughly speaking, the tree represents the steps of the execution of the mechanism. As long
as the current visited vertex u is not a leaf, the mechanism concurrently interacts with agents
in S(u). Different edges outgoing from vertex u are used for modeling the different actions that
agents can take during this interaction with the mechanism. In particular, each possible action
is assigned to an edge outgoing from u. As suggested above, the action that agent i takes may
depend on her presumed type bi ∈ Di. That is, different presumed types may correspond to
taking different actions, and thus to different edges. The label T (e) on edge e = (u, v) then lists
the type profiles that enable agents in S(u) to take those actions that have been assigned to e.
In other words, when the agents take the actions assigned to edge e, then the mechanism (and
the other agents) can infer that the type profile must be contained in T (e). The constraints
on the edges’ label can be then explained as follows: first we can safely assume that different
actions must correspond to different type profiles (indeed, if two different actions are enabled
by the same profiles we can consider them as a single action); second, we can safely assume
that each action must correspond to at least one type profile that has not been excluded yet
by actions taken before node u was visited (otherwise, we could have excluded this type profile
earlier); third, we have that the action taken by agents in S(u) can only inform about types of
agents in S(u) and not about the type of the remaining agents (that are completely unknown
to agents in S(u)). The execution ends when we reach a leaf ℓ of the tree. In this case, the
mechanism returns the outcome that labels ℓ.
Observe that, according to the definition above, for every profile b there is only one leaf ℓ =
ℓ(b) such that b belongs to T (φ(ℓ), ℓ). For this reason we say thatM(b) = X(ℓ). Moreover, for
every type profile b and every node u ∈ V , we say that b is compatible with u if b ∈ T (φ(u), u).
Finally, two profiles b, b′ are said to diverge at vertex u if there are two vertices v, v′ such that
(u, v) ∈ E, (u, v′) ∈ E and b ∈ T (u, v), whereas b′ ∈ T (u, v′).
We are now ready to define obvious strategyproofness. An extensive-form mechanism M is
obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if for every agent i, for every vertex u such that i ∈ S(u), for
every b−i,b
′
−i, and for every bi ∈ Di such that (ti,b−i) and (bi,b
′
−i) are compatible with u, but
diverge at u, it holds that ci(ti,M(ti,b−i)) ≤ ci(ti,M(bi,b
′
−i)). Roughly speaking, an obvious
strategy-proof mechanism requires that, at each time step agent i is asked to take a decision
that depends on her type, the worst cost that she can pay if at this time step she behaves
according to her true type is at least the same as the best cost achievable by behaving as she
had a different type.
Hence, if a mechanism is obviously strategy-proof, then it is also strategy-proof. Indeed, the
latter requires that truthful behavior is a dominant strategy when agents know the entire type
profile, whereas the former requires that it continues to be a dominant strategy even if agents
have only a partial knowledge of profiles1, limited to what they observed in the mechanism up
to the time they are called to take their choices.
We say that an extensive-form mechanism is trivial if for every vertex u ∈ V and for every
two type profiles b,b′, it holds that b and b′ do not diverge at u. That is, a mechanism is
trivial if it never requires that agents take actions that depend on their type. Observe that if
a mechanism M is not trivial, then every path from the root to one leaf goes through a vertex
u⋆ such that there are two type profiles b,b′ that diverge at u⋆. Since b 6= b′, then there
exists at least one agent i⋆ such that bi⋆ 6= b
′
i⋆ . Moreover, by our definition of extensive-form
mechanism, it must be the case that i⋆ ∈ S(u⋆). For this reason, we call i⋆ as the divergent
agent for the mechanism M. Note that the divergent agent takes a decision that depends on
her own type before any other agents revealed any information about their own type. For this
reason, in order to prove that a mechanism is not obviously strategy-proof, it is sufficient to
show that there are two type profiles b,b′ with bi⋆ 6= b
′
i⋆ such that they diverge at u
⋆, and
1In fact, OSP implies – but is not equivalent to – weakly group strategyproofness [Li, 2015].
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ci⋆(bi⋆ ,M(b)) > ci⋆(bi⋆ ,M(b
′)).
Let us state two further properties of obvious strategyproofness, that turn out to be very
useful in the rest of the paper. First, it is not hard to see that if M is OSP when the type
profile is taken from D, then it continues to be OSP even if the types are only allowed to be
selected from D′ = D′1 × · · · ×D
′
n, where D
′
i ⊆ Di. Moreover, let us define M
′ obtained from
M by pruning the paths involving actions corresponding to types in D \D′. IfM is OSP, then
also M′ enjoys this property [Li, 2015].
Monitoring. LetM(b) denote the outcome returned by mechanismM = (f,p) when agents
take actions according to b. Commonly, the cost paid by agent i to implementM(b) is defined as
a quasi-linear combination of agent’s true cost2 ti(f(b)) and payment pi(b), i.e., ci(ti,M(b)) =
ti(f(b))− pi(b). This approach disregards the agent’s declaration for evaluating her cost.
In mechanisms with monitoring the usual quasi-linear definition is maintained but costs paid
by the agents are more strictly tied to their declarations [Kova´cs et al., 2015]. Specifically, in a
mechanism with monitoring M, the bid bi is a lower bound on agent i’s cost for f(bi,b−i), so
an agent is allowed to have a real cost higher than bi(f(b)) but not lower.
3 Formally, we have
ci(ti,M(b)) = max{ti(f(b)), bi(f(b))} − pi(b).
We next describe two specific problems of interest.
Machine Scheduling. Here, we are given a set of m different jobs to execute and the n
agents control related machines. That is, agent i has a job-independent processing time ti per
unit of job (equivalently, an execution speed 1/ti that is independent from the actual jobs). The
social choice function f must choose a possible schedule f(b) = (f1(b), . . . , fn(b)) of jobs to
the machines, where fi(b) denotes the job load assigned to machine i when agents take actions
according to b. The cost that agent i faces for the schedule f(b) is ti(f(b)) = ti · fi(b). Note
that our mechanisms for machine scheduling will always pay the agents.
Monitoring can be readily implemented for this setting. In fact, monitoring means that those
agents who have exaggerated their unitary processing time, i.e., they take actions according to
bi > ti, can be made to process up to time bi instead of the true processing time ti. For example,
we could not allow any other operation in the time interval [ti, bi] or charge bi − ti.
We focus on social choice functions f∗ optimizing the makespan, i.e.,
f∗(b) ∈ argmin
x
mc(x,b), mc(x,b) =
n
max
i=1
bi(x).
We say that f is α-approximate if it returns a solution whose cost is a factor α away from the
optimum.
Facility Location. In the facility location problem, the type ti of each agent consists of her
position on the real line. The social choice function f must choose a position f(b) ∈ R for
the facility. The cost that agent i pays for a chosen position f(b) is ti(f(b)) = d(ti, f(b)) =
|ti−f(b)|. So, ti(f(b)) denotes the distance between ti and the location of the facility computed
by f when agents take actions according to b.
2Note that ti(f(b)) depends only on the type of the agent and the outcome of the social choice function.
3We highlight that the designer only checks that agents are not “faster” than declared. That is, agents can
pretend to have a higher cost/processing time at the expense of being “busy” that long (e.g., designer and agents
could be in the same room). Agents can still underbid and at execution time have a higher cost (e.g., they could
say to have underestimated their cost/work). Note that contrarily to the notion of verification in [Nisan and
Ronen, 2001] there is here no punishment for this misbehavior.
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We can implement monitoring also in this setting whenever evidences of the distance can
be provided (and cannot be counterfeited). In fact, in this context, monitoring means that
ti(f(b)) = max{d(ti, f(b)), d(bi, f(b))}. Therefore, once the evidence is provided, the mecha-
nism can check whether ti(f(b)) < bi(f(b)) and charge the agent the difference for cheating.
4
We focus on social choice functions f∗ optimizing the social cost, i.e.,
f∗(b) ∈ argmin
x∈R
cost(x,b), cost(x,b) =
n∑
i=1
bi(x).
As above, we say that f is α-approximate if it returns a solution whose cost is at most a factor
α away from the optimum.
3 A General Positive Result
For an algorithm f , define pi(b) = bi(f(b)). We call the direct-revelation mechanism (f, p) a
first-price mechanism.
Theorem 1. Any direct-revelation first-price mechanism is OSP with monitoring and satisfies
voluntary participation.
Proof. In order to prove that M = (f, p) is OSP, consider agent i and let ti be her true type.
We next show that for agent i it is always convenient to be truthful, regardless of the decisions
taken by other agents. To this aim, let us recall that in a mechanism with monitoring the cost
that i pays, given the submitted type profile is b, is
ci(ti,M(b)) = max{ti(fi(b)), bi(fi(b))} − pi(b).
Suppose that i is truthful; then for every b−i, it turns out that
ci(ti,M(ti,b−i)) = ti(fi(ti,b−i))− pi(ti,b−i) = 0.
Suppose, instead, that i lies and says bi. Then for all b−i, if bi(fi(b)) > ti(fi(b)) then
ci(ti,M(bi,b−i)) = bi(fi(bi,b−i))− pi(bi,b−i) = 0;
if, instead, ti(fi(b)) ≥ bi(fi(b)) then
ci(ti,M(bi,b−i)) = ti(fi(bi,b−i))− pi(bi,b−i) > 0.
Note that all the cost (in)equalities hold no matter the value of b−i. Thus, in both cases the
best cost that i can obtain by adopting a strategy different from the truthful one is not smaller
than the worst cost that i can obtain by adopting the truthful strategy, as desired.
It is important to note that in the construction above, we may use every algorithm as a black
box. This in particular means that we can turn any optimal (approximation, resp.) algorithm
into an optimal (approximate, resp.) OSP mechanism with monitoring (without losses to the
approximation guarantee, resp.). Thus, for Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) with additive bidders
our mechanism with monitoring beats the lower bound proved by Bade and Gonczarowski [2016]
4One relevant applicative scenario here is for example reimbursement of previously declared expenses. These
expenses are usually reimbursed only upon production of receipts so that for agents to be consistent with over-
bidding they need to pay the exaggerated (reported) cost. Receipts are then a tool for “monitoring” the agents.
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for OSP mechanisms.5 Just as the weaker notion of verification has been shown to be useful
in the context of truthful CAs without money [Fotakis et al., 2014], our result shows that
OSP with monitoring matches the best-known (poynomial-time) approximations achieved not
only by truthful mechanisms [Krysta et al., 2015, Lehmann et al., 2002], but also by general
algorithms [Hurkens and Schrijver, 1989, Halldo´rsson, 1999].
We also stress that this construction is query optimal, as the interaction with each agent is
minimum. It is worthy to observe that such an interaction does not need to be simultaneous
(as assumed in practically all the literature on direct-revelation mechanisms) since obvious
strategyproofness is maintained even if agents are queried in an adversarially chosen order and
know what the bidders preceding them have declared. We will see how to exploit this property
to reduce our payments for facility location. Finally, as observed above, we do not require the
domain of each agent to be finite.
4 Machine Scheduling
We now show that, without monitoring, there is no OSP mechanism that satisfies voluntary
participation and returns an assignment of jobs to machines whose makespan is at most twice
the makespan of the optimal assignment. Interestingly, this is the same lower bound that
Nisan and Ronen [2001] proved for the approximation ratio of strategy-proof mechanisms for
unrelated machines, i.e., when it is not possible to express the processing time of jobs on
machines as a product of jobs’ load and machine’s unit processing time. We wonder if a
more deep relationship exists between OSP mechanisms for scheduling on related machines and
strategy-proof mechanisms for scheduling on unrelated machines, and if one can improve the
lower bound for the former problem in order to match the best known lower bounds for the
latter, i.e., 1 + φ ≈ 2.61 for general mechanisms [Koutsoupias and Vidali, 2007], and n for
anonymous mechanisms [Ashlagi et al., 2012].
Theorem 2. For every ε > 0, there is no (2 − ε)-approximate mechanism for the machine
scheduling problem that is OSP without monitoring and satisfies voluntary participation.
Proof. Let us consider the simple setting in which there are exactly two machines, that we
denote with 0 and 1, and two equivalent jobs of unit length. We will denote with t0 and t1
the type, i.e., the job processing time, of machine 0 and 1, respectively. Suppose there is a
k-approximate, with k < 2, OSP mechanism M that satisfies voluntary participation.
Since the mechanism is k-approximate, then it must be the case that: if t0 <
t1
2k , then
M assigns both jobs to machine 0; if t0 > 2k · t1, then M assigns both jobs to machine 1; if
k
2 · t1 < t0 <
2
k
· t1, then M assigns one job to each machine.
Moreover, since mechanism M = (f,p) is OSP, then it must be also strategy-proof. Archer
and Tardos [2001] proved that a mechanism for the machine scheduling problem is strategy-
proof and satisfies voluntary participation if and only if (i) the allocation of jobs to machine
i ∈ {0, 1} returned by f when the type of the other machine is t1−i ismonotone, i.e., fi(ti, t1−i) ≤
fi(t
′
i, t1−i) whenever ti > t
′
i; (ii) the payment that the machine i receives is
pi(ti, t1−i) = tifi(ti, t1−i) +
∫ ∞
ti
fi(x, t1−i)dx.
In our setting, the monotonicity requirement implies that, for every t1−i, there are t
′ ∈[
t1−i
2k ,
k
2 · t1−i
]
and t′′ ∈
[
2
k
· t1−i, 2k · t1−i
]
, such that machine i is assigned both jobs if ti < t
′,
5We presented our setting for agents having a cost to implement the solution chosen by the mechanism; clearly,
in CAs, agents have a non-negative valuation (i.e., non-positive cost) for the outcome of the auction. Since the
theorem does not require the agents’ costs to be positive, we can apply it also to CAs.
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only one job if t′ ≤ ti ≤ t
′′, and no jobs if ti > t
′′. Hence, pi(ti, t1−i) = t
′ + t′′ if ti < t
′,
pi(ti, t1−i) = t
′′ if t′ ≤ ti ≤ t
′′, and pi(ti, t1−i) = 0 otherwise.
Let us now restrict the domain of the agents to D′ = {a, b}2, with b > k2a. Let M′ be the
mechanism obtained by pruning M according to this restriction. As stated above, M′ must
be an OSP mechanism. Moreover, the approximation ratio of M′ cannot be worse than the
approximation ratio of M. Hence, M′ cannot be trivial (indeed, a trivial mechanism would
have approximation ratio worse than k).
Let i be the divergent agent of M′. Clearly, a and b are the types in which i diverges.
Suppose that ti = a. If i behaves according to ti, then it may be the case that the other agent
behaves according type a too. As showed above, in this case machine i receives one job and
payment t′′ ≤ 2ka. Hence, ci(a,M(a, a)) ≥ a − 2ka. Suppose instead that i behaves as if
her type was b. It may be the case that the other agent behaves according type b too. Then,
machine i still receives one job and a payment t′′ ≥ 2
k
· b. Hence,
ci(a,M(b, b)) ≤ a−
2
k
· b < a− 2ka = ci(a,M(a, a)),
where we used that b > k2a. In words, the best cost paid by i if she does not behave according
to her true type can be lower than the worst cost she can pay if she behaves according to her
true type. Then, the mechanism M′ is not OSP, contradicting our hypothesis.
Since there is a PTAS for the allocation of jobs to related machines [Hochbaum and Shmoys,
1988], then we have the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. There is an OSP mechanism with monitoring that computes the optimal schedul-
ing of jobs to related machines (in exponential time). Moreover, there is an OSP mechanism
with monitoring that is a PTAS for the same problem. Both mechanisms satisfy voluntary
participation.
5 Facility Location
We now show that, without monitoring, there is no OSP mechanism for the facility location
problem with an approximation ratio better than n − 1. To this aim, let us first state the
following simple observation.
Observation 1. For every α, β, with α < β, no k-approximate mechanism M = (f,p), with
k < n − 1, sets f(x) ≤ α, if xi = α and xj = β for every j 6= i, and f(y) ≥ β, if yi = β and
yj = α for every j 6= i.
The observation will be proved below in a more general statement.
Theorem 3. For every ε > 0, there is no (n− 1− ε)-approximate mechanism for the facility
location problem that is OSP without monitoring.
Proof. Let M = (f,p) be a (n− 1− ε)-approximate mechanism that is OSP without monitor-
ing. Let us restrict the domain of every agent to D′ = {a, a+δ, . . . , b−δ, b}, where δ ≤ ε
n−2 ·
b−a
2 .
LetM′ be the mechanism obtained by pruningM according to this restriction. As stated above,
M′ must be an OSP mechanism. Moreover, the approximation ratio of M′ cannot be worse
than the approximation ratio of M. Hence, M′ cannot be trivial, otherwise its approximation
ratio would be unbounded.
Then, let i be the divergent agent of M′. Note that, by definition of divergent agent, there
must be two types ti, t
′
i of agent i such that t
′
i = ti + δ and i takes an action in M
′ when her
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type is ti that is different from the action taken when her type is t
′
i. We denote as c and d the
smallest ti and the largest t
′
i, respectively, for which this occurs, i.e., c is the smallest type in
D′ such that i diverges on c and c+ δ, and d is the largest type in D′ such that i diverges on d
and d− δ.
Note that either c < b+a2 or d >
b+a
2 . Indeed, if c ≥
b+a
2 , then d ≥ c + δ >
b+a
2 . In the rest
of the proof we will assume that c < a+b2 . The proof for the case that d >
a+b
2 simply requires
to replace c with d, c+ δ with d− δ, and b with a, and invert the direction of the inequalities
in the next claims.
The proof uses two profiles x and y, that are defined as follows:
• xi = c+ δ, and xk = c for every k 6= i,;
• yi = c, and yk = b for every k 6= i.
We begin by using OSP to relate payments and outcomes of the mechanism M′ on input x
and y. Specifically, we note that if the real location of i is ti = xi = c+ δ then ci(ti,M
′(x)) =
d(c+ δ, f(x))− pi(x), and ci(ti,M
′(y)) = d(c+ δ, f(y))− pi(y). Since i diverges on c and c+ δ
and M′ is OSP, we have that ci(ti,M
′(x)) ≤ ci(ti,M
′(y)). Hence, it follows that
pi(x) ≥ pi(y)− d(c+ δ, f(y)) + d(c+ δ, f(x)). (1)
Suppose instead that the real location of i is t′i = yi = c then ci(t
′
i,M
′(x)) = d(c, f(x)) −
pi(x), and ci(t
′
i,M
′(y)) = d(c, f(y)) − pi(y). As above, since i diverges on c and c+ δ and M
′
is OSP, we have that ci(t
′
i,M
′(y)) ≤ ci(t
′
i,M
′(x)). Hence, it follows that
pi(x) ≤ pi(y)− d(c, f(y)) + d(c, f(x)). (2)
Therefore, in order to satisfy both (1) and (2), we need that
d(c+ δ, f(y)) − d(c, f(y)) ≥ d(c+ δ, f(x)) − d(c, f(x)). (3)
Using (3) above, we first show that f(x) must be at most c and then that f(y) ≤ c + δ.
Finally, we prove how this last fact contradicts the desired approximation ratio.
Let us first show that f(x) ≥ c. Suppose instead that f(x) < c. Since f(x) < c, then the
r.h.s. of (3) is δ. As for the l.h.s., we distinguish two cases. If f(y) ≤ c+ δ, then, since f(y) > c
according to Observation 1, then we have (c + δ − f(y)) − (f(y) − c) = δ − 2(f(y) − c) < δ.
If f(y) > c + δ, we have (f(y) − (c + δ)) − (f(y) − c) = −δ. Hence, in both cases we reach a
contradiction.
We now show that f(y) ≤ c+δ. Assume by contradiction that f(y) > c+δ. Since f(x) ≥ c,
and f(x) < c+ δ by Observation 1, we can rewrite (3) as
(f(y)− (c+ δ))− (f(y)− c) ≥ ((c + δ) − f(x))− (f(x)− c)⇒ −δ ≥ δ − 2(f(x)− c).
However, this is impossible since f(x) < c+ δ.
Finally, we prove that, given that f(y) ≤ c + δ, then the mechanism is not (n − 1 − ε)-
approximate. Indeed, since by Observation 1 f(y) > c, the total cost of mechanism M′ on
input y is
(f(y)− c) + (n− 1) (b− f(y)) = (n− 1)b− c− (n− 2)f(y)
≥ (n− 1)(b− c)− (n− 2)δ
≥ (n− 1)(b− c)− (n− 2)
ε
n− 2
·
b− a
2
> (n− 1− ε)(b − c),
where we used that b − c > b − b+a2 =
b−a
2 . However, this is absurd, since M
′ is (n − 1 − ε)-
approximate and the optimal mechanism on input y places the facility in b and has total cost
b− c.
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Next show that if we insist on mechanisms without money, then there is no OSP mechanism
that can guarantee an approximation ratio better than n− 1 even when the mechanism can use
monitoring.
Theorem 4. For every ε > 0, there is no (n − 1 − ε)-approximate mechanism without money
for the facility location problem that is OSP, even with monitoring.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we first need to state the following lemma, that can be seen
as a quantitative version of Observation 1.
Lemma 1. Consider a type profile b such that bi = x for some i and bj = x − α for every
j 6= i. Then f(b) ∈
[
x− α
(
1 + k−1
n
)
, x− α
(
1− k−1
n−2
)]
for every k-approximate mechanism.
Proof. The optimal facility location for the given setting consists in placing the facility in
position x− α. The total cost in this case is α.
If f(b) < x−α
(
1 + k−1
n
)
, then the total cost is larger than (n−1) (k−1)α
n
+α+ (k−1)α
n
= kα,
thus no k-approximate mechanism can place the facility in f(b). Similarly, if f(b) > x −
α
(
1− k−1
n−2
)
, then the total cost is (n− 1)(f −x+α)+x− f = (n− 2)(f −x)+ (n− 1)α > kα,
thus no k-approximate mechanism can place the facility in f(b).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose there is an OSP mechanism M that is (n − 1 − ε)-approximate.
Clearly, the mechanism is non-trivial, otherwise its approximation ratio would be unbounded.
Then, let i be the divergent agent of M, and let xi and yi be the types in which i diverges.
W.l.o.g., assume that xi > yi. Let λ = 2 (xi − yi) and α = λ·
n−2
ε
. Let xi be the truthful position
of this agent. If i plays truthfully, then she can face the setting in which the remaining n − 1
agents are in position xi−α. By applying Lemma 1 with k = n−1−ε and x = xi, we have that
the distance of agent i from the facility must be at least xi−xi+α
(
1− n−2−ε
n−2
)
= α · ε
n−2 = λ.
Suppose that instead i plays as if her real location would be yi. It may be then the case
that the remaining n − 1 agents are exactly in the same position. Then, any mechanism with
bounded approximation must place the facility in yi = xi −
λ
2 . Recall that, with monitoring,
the cost of agent i must be taken as the maximum between the distance to the facility either
from the real position or from the declared position. In this case, this is given by the former
distance and it is λ2 < λ. Thus, the best cost paid by i by not playing truthfully is lower than
the worst cost that she can pay by playing truthfully. Then, the mechanism M is not OSP,
contradicting our hypothesis.
The bounds above are tight, since there is a (n−1)-approximate mechanism without money
for the facility location problem that is OSP, even without monitoring. Consider, indeed, the
dictatorship mechanism, in which only the dictator i is queried for her position. It is well-known
that this mechanism is (n − 1)-approximate. We next observe that it is also OSP. Agent i is
the only agent that is involved in a decision and it is always better for her to reveal her real
position xi: indeed, in this case the facility will be located exactly in her position and the cost
of i will be 0, whereas by declaring a different position x 6= xi the cost will be |x− xi| > 0.
5.1 Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Facility Location
Interestingly, monitoring gives an enormous power in this setting. Indeed, since the optimal
facility location is the median among the positions declared by agents, it follows from Theorem
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1 that there is an OSP mechanism with monitoring that computes the optimal facility location
in polynomial time.
Recall that in this mechanism the agents receive a payment. As noted in the introduction,
however, for facility location problem we might need alternative mechanisms in which it is not
the designer to pay agents, but the agents to pay the mechanism. Note that this is more natural
in settings wherein agents’ payments can be easily implemented via subscription fees or delayed
access to the facility. We next present such an alternative optimal OSP mechanism.
We are going to assume that we are given some bounds on the agents’ potential locations.
(Note that in some of the related literature on facility location, agents can declare any location
in R.) To simplify the notation, we assume that Di = [a, b] for all agents i. Consider now the
following direct-revelation mechanism, that we call interval mechanism:
1. Query agents for their position.
2. Let x be the profile of the collected positions. Then fix the location f(x) of the facility
to be the median of x. In case of multiple medians, the facility is located on the leftmost
median.
3. For every agent i = 1, . . . , n, set pi(x) = d(xi, f(x)) − (b− a).
It is not hard to see that the interval mechanism simply “shifts” the payments of the mech-
anism in Theorem 1 to make them of the right sign. In a sense, the theorem below proves that,
just like truthfulness, OSP is preserved when these shifts are bid independent.
Theorem 5. The interval mechanism is an optimal mechanism that is OSP with monitoring.
Proof. We will next prove that the mechanism is OSP, and thus each agent has an incentive
to declare her real position. Since the mechanism places the facility in the median of these
positions, it then turns out to be optimal as well.
In order to prove that it is OSP, recall that in a mechanism with monitoring the cost that
i pays is ci(xi,M(y)) = max{d(xi, f(y)), d(yi, f(y))} − pi(y). Consider then agent i and let xi
be her real position. If i declares the real position, then her total cost will be b−a. If i declares
a different position x′i, then there are two cases: if minx′−i ci(xi,M(x
′)) is achieved in a profile
x′−i such that f(x
′) 6= x′i, then
ci(xi,M(x
′)) = max{d(xi, f(x
′)), d(x′i, f(x
′))} − pi(x
′)
≥ d(x′i, f(x
′))− pi(x
′) = b− a;
otherwise (that is, if f(x′) = x′i 6= xi)
ci(xi,M(x
′)) = max{d(xi, f(x
′)), d(x′i, f(x
′))} − pi(x
′)
= d(xi, x
′
i)− pi(x
′) > b− a.
Thus, in both cases the best cost that i can obtain by declaring a position different from the
real one is not smaller than the worst cost that i can obtain by playing truthfully.
The drawback of the interval mechanism is that the payment that this mechanism charges
may be as large as the size of the interval. This opens the question of whether more frugal
payment schemes exist — or in other words, how susceptible OSP with monitoring is to payment
shifts that are not bid independent.
We will show in Section 5.1.1 that it is indeed possible to slightly optimize the interval
mechanism in order to be less expensive for the agents. We further prove that our optimization
is optimal as long as we focus on direct-revelation mechanisms. However, even this optimized
version still requires that O(n) agents will pay an amount that is about b−a. We will show that
this is somewhat unavoidable, even if one considers mechanisms that are not direct-revelation.
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5.1.1 The Optimized Interval Mechanism
Consider the following optimized version of the interval mechanism, that we call Optimized
Interval Mechanism (OIM):
1. Query agents for their position.
2. Let x be the profile of the collected positions. Then fix the location f(x) of the facility
to be the median of x. In case of multiple medians, the facility is located on the leftmost
median.
3. For every agent i ∈ [n], let Ki (ki, resp.) be the set (number, resp.) of agents queried
before i. Let s = (s1, . . . , ski) be the profile containing the locations declared by these
agents in non-decreasing order. Let ℓ =
⌈
n
2
⌉
+ ki−n+1 and r =
⌈
n
2
⌉
− 1. If ℓ > 1, r < ki
and sℓ−1 = sr+1, then set pi(x) = 0 for every x = ((s, xi),x−Ki∪{i}).
Otherwise, we define Li and Ri as follows:
Li =
{
sℓ, if ℓ ≥ 1;
a, otherwise.
Ri =
{
sr, if r ≤ ki;
b, otherwise.
Let also define Ai and Bi as follows:
Ai =


Li, if Li = Ri;
2Li − b, if Ri > Li >
a+b
2 ;
a, otherwise.
Bi =


Ri, if Li = Ri;
2Ri − a, if Li < Ri <
a+b
2 ;
b, otherwise.
Finally, let mi = max{Ri −Ai, Bi − Li}.
If xi ∈ [Ai, Bi], then set pi(x) = d(xi, f(x))−mi for every x.
If xi < Ai, then set pi(x) = d(xi, f(x))−mi − d(xi, Ai) for every x.
If xi > Bi, then set pi(x) = d(xi, f(x))−mi − d(xi, Bi) for every x.
The idea behind OIM is to exploit the information given by the interactive implementation
of the mechanism to reduce the charge to the bidders, i.e., use the value of ki to reduce the
payment to bidder i. In fact, when all bidders bid simultaneously then ki = 0 for all i and OIM
is simply the interval mechanism.
The way in which this optimization upon ki is done can arguably appear a bit complex but
is not too hard to explain. First, when sℓ−1 = sr+1, then the facility will be placed in sℓ−1
regardless of the location declared by i and by every other agent j queried after i. Hence, these
agents will not have any incentive in declaring a position that is different from their real location
even without payments.
As for the second and most important optimization step, we consider profiles x for which
there are agents very far away from the facility. Indeed, as we will hint in Lemma 2, the facility
is very likely to be included in the interval [Li, Ri]. Thus, if an agent i in x is very far away from
this interval, one can slightly lower the payment assigned to her for every other profile and still
have an OSP mechanism. Indeed, no such agent has an incentive to either move from another
profile to x (obviously) nor to move from x to another profile x′ (if the payment reduction
is comparable with the distance between xi and x
′
i). More details on the effectiveness of this
optimization can be found in Lemma 9.
We highlight that this last optimization is particularly relevant when there is a location f
such that when i declares f , then the facility will securely be located in f even if sℓ−1 6= sr+1
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(this case corresponds to Li = Ri = f). In this case, it is possible to reduce the cost of every
agent i in profile x from b− a to |xi − f |.
Nevertheless, we note that the mechanism still has very large costs, namely b − a, for at
least
⌈
n
2
⌉
− 1 agents. Indeed, for these agents, it turns out that Li = Ai = a and Ri = Bi = b,
and thus mi = b− a. We will show that this is inevitable with a direct-revelation mechanism.
We say that a profile x′ is i-compatible if x′ = (xKi ,x
′
−Ki
), i.e., x′j = xj for all the agents
j ∈ Ki. Before proving the properties of OIM, let us make some observations on Li and Ri.
Lemma 2. For every i, and every t > Li, f(x
′) ≥ Li for every i-compatible profile x
′ with
x′i = t, and there is one such profile for which f(x
′) = Li. Similarly, for every t < Ri,
f(x′) ≤ Ri for every i-compatible profile x
′ with x′i = t, and there is one such profile for which
f(x′) = Ri.
Proof. Let t > Li and consider the profile x
′ such that
x′j =


xj , if j ∈ Ki;
t, if j = i;
a, otherwise.
It is easy to see that f(x′) = Li. Indeed, if ℓ < 1, then in x
′ there are n−ki−1 =
⌈
n
2
⌉
−ℓ >
⌈
n
2
⌉
−1
agents whose location is a. Hence, the leftmost median of x′ must be a = Li. If ℓ ≥ 1, then Li is
the ℓ-th smallest location among agents that are processed before i, and there are in x′ exactly
n−ki−1 agents whose location is surely not larger than Li. Then Li is the ℓ+n−ki−1 =
⌈
n
2
⌉
-th
smallest location in x′, i.e. the (leftmost) median.
On the other hand, it is immediate to see that there is no declaration by agents j /∈ Ki,
with j 6= i, that can make the facility go to the left of Li.
Let now t < Ri and consider the profile x
′ such that
x′j =


xj , if j ∈ Ki;
t, if j = i;
b, otherwise.
It is easy to see that f(x′) = Ri. Indeed, if r > ki, then in x
′ there are n− ki − 1 >
⌊
n
2
⌋
agents
whose location is b. Hence, the median of x′ is b = Ri. If r ≤ ki, then Ri is the r-th smallest
location among agents that are processed before i, and there is in x′ exactly one agent whose
location is smaller than Ri. Then Ri is the r + 1 =
⌈
n
2
⌉
-th smallest location in x′, i.e. the
(leftmost) median.
Moreover, as above, it is immediate to see that there is no declaration by agents j /∈ Ki,
with j 6= i, that can make the facility go to the right of Ri.
Lemma 3. For every i, and every t ≤ Li, f(x
′) ≥ t for every i-compatible profile x′ with x′i = t.
Similarly, for every t ≥ Ri, f(x
′) ≤ t for every i-compatible profile x′ with x′i = t.
Proof. Let t ≤ Li and consider the profile x
′ such that
x′j =


xj , if j ∈ Ki;
t, if j = i;
a, otherwise.
If ℓ ≥ 1, then Li is the ℓ-th smallest location among agents that are processed before i, and
there are in x′ exactly n− ki agents whose location is surely not larger than Li. Then Li is the
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ℓ+ n− ki =
⌈
n
2
⌉
+ 1-th smallest location in x′. Thus, the leftmost median of x′ will be sℓ−1 if
t ≤ sℓ−1 and t otherwise. When ℓ < 1, then Li = a and clearly f(x
′) ≥ a.
If t ≥ Ri, let us consider the profile x
′ such that
x′j =


xj , if j ∈ Ki;
t, if j = i;
b, otherwise.
If r ≤ ki, then Ri is the r-th smallest location among agents that are processed before i, and
there is in x′ no agent whose location is surely smaller than Ri. Then Ri is the r =
⌈
n
2
⌉
− 1-th
smallest location in x′. Thus, the leftmost median of x′ will be sr+1 if t ≥ sr+1 and t otherwise.
When r > ki, then Ri = b and clearly f(x
′) ≤ b.
We first show that OIM is optimal and OSP with monitoring. Next we will prove that no
direct-revelation mechanism enjoys the same properties with lower payments.
Theorem 6. OIM is an optimal mechanism that is OSP with monitoring.
Proof. We will next prove that the mechanism is OSP with monitoring, and thus for each agent
it is obviously dominant to declare her real position. Since OIM places the facility on the median
of these positions, it then turns out to be optimal as well.
Consider then agent i and let xi be her real position. If sℓ−1 = sr+1 = λ, then the facility will
be located in λ and i receives a zero payment, regardless of her declaration and the declarations
of the agents not in Ki.
Suppose now that sℓ−1 6= sr+1 and the real position of i is xi ∈ [Ai, Bi]. If i declares her
real position, then her total cost will be at most mi. If i declares a different position x
′
i, then
for every i-compatible profile x′
ci(xi,M(x
′)) = max{d(xi, f(x
′)), d(x′i, f(x
′))} − pi(x
′)
≥ d(x′i, f(x
′))− pi(x
′) = ci(x
′
i,M(x
′)) ≥ mi.
Suppose now that sℓ−1 6= sr+1 and the real position of i is xi = Ai − c or xi = Bi + c with
c > 0. W.l.o.g. we will assume xi = Ai − c. If i declares the real position, then her total cost
will be at most mi + c. If i declares a position x
′
i = Ai − c
′ or x′i = Bi + c
′ with c′ > c, then for
every i-compatible profile x′ we have that
ci(xi,M(x
′)) = max{d(xi, f(x
′)), d(x′i, f(x
′))} − pi(x
′) ≥ d(x′i, f(x
′))− pi(x
′)
≥ mi + c
′ > mi + c.
If i declares a position x′i = Ai − c
′ for 0 < c′ < c, then for every i-compatible profile x′ we
have that
ci(xi,M(x
′)) = max{d(xi, f(x
′)), d(x′i, f(x
′))} − pi(x
′) = d(xi, f(x
′))− pi(x
′)
= d(xi, x
′
i) + d(x
′
i, f(x
′))− pi(x
′) = (c− c′) +mi + c
′ = mi + c,
where we used that, according to Lemma 3, f(x′) ≥ x′i and thus d(xi, f(x
′)) = d(xi, x
′
i) +
d(x′i, f(x)).
If i instead declares a position x′i ∈ [Ai, Bi + c], then for every i-compatible profile x
′ such
that f(x′) ≥ x′i we have that
ci(xi,M(x
′)) = max{d(xi, f(x
′)), d(x′i, f(x
′))} − pi(x
′) = d(xi, f(x
′))− pi(x
′)
= d(xi, x
′
i) + d(x
′
i, f(x
′))− pi(x
′) ≥ mi + c.
(4)
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For every i-compatible profile x′ such that f(x′) < x′i, we have instead that
ci(xi,M(x
′)) = max{d(xi, f(x
′)), d(x′i, f(x
′))} − pi(x
′) = d(xi, f(x
′))− pi(x
′)
= d(xi, f(x
′))− d(x′i, f(x
′)) +mi +max{0, x
′
i −Bi}
= f(x′)− xi − x
′
i + f(x
′) +mi +max{0, x
′
i −Bi}
≥ (Li − xi)− (x
′
i − Li) +mi +max{0, x
′
i −Bi}
= (Li −Ai) + (Ai − xi)− (x
′
i −Bi)− (Bi − Li) +mi +max{0, x
′
i −Bi}
≥ mi + c,
(5)
where we used that, according to Lemma 2, f(x′) ≥ Li, and that Ai > a, and therefore
d(x′i, f(x
′)) ≤ Bi + c− Li = Li −Ai + c = Li − xi ≤ d(xi, f(x
′)).
Theorem 7. Every optimal OSP direct-revelation mechanism M = (f,p) either sets payments
at least as high as OIM, or there is an agent i and a profile y such that pi(y) > 0.
Proof. Let M = (f,p) be an optimal OSP direct-revelation mechanism, and suppose that it
assigns the lowest possible payments. Fix a player i and recall that Ki is the set of agents
whose location is known to i when she is queried. Clearly, no mechanism can set lower non-
positive payments than OIM when sℓ−1 = sr+1. Thus, we can safely consider that sℓ−1 6= sr+1.
Next lemmata show some conditions that payments must satisfy in order for M to be OSP
and to minimize payments. Specifically, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 focus on profiles x such that
xi ∈ [Ai, Bi] and Li 6= Ri, Lemma 6 consider profiles x such that xi = Li = Ri, whereas
Lemma 7 focuses on the remaining profiles.
Suppose first that Li 6= Ri. Then let µi be the minimum cost that i pays in a profile x such
that f(x) 6= xi (such a profile surely exists since, by optimality of M, i is not a dictator), i.e.,
µi = minx : f(x)6=xi ci(xi,M(x)). We begin by proving this useful claim.
Claim 1. Let x be a profile such that f(x) 6= xi and ci(xi,M(x)) = µi. If xi < f(x), then
for every yi ∈ (xi,min{2f(x) − xi, b}], it turns out that ci(yi,M(y)) = µi if f(y) 6= yi, and
ci(yi,M(y)) ≤ µi otherwise.
Similarly, if xi > f(x), then for every yi ∈ [max{a, 2f(x) − xi}, xi), it turns out that
ci(yi,M(y)) = µi if f(y) 6= yi, and ci(yi,M(y)) ≤ µi otherwise.
Proof. Since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on yi and xi. Then, since M
is OSP, it must be the case that
ci(yi,M(y)) ≤ ci(yi,M(x)) = max{d(yi, f(x)), d(xi, f(x))} − pi(x)
= d(xi, f(x))− pi(x) = ci(xi,M(x)) = µi,
where we used that d(yi, f(x)) ≤ d(xi, f(x)) by definition of yi.
However, if f(y) 6= yi, then, by definition of µi, it must be the case that ci(yi,M(y)) ≥ µi,
that leaves ci(yi,M(y)) = µi as the only possible option.
Lemma 4. If Li 6= Ri, then for every yi ∈ [Ai, Bi], ci(yi,M(y)) = µi if f(y) 6= yi, and
ci(yi,M(y)) ≤ µi otherwise.
Proof. Consider the following procedure:
1. Let w = 1, ∆0 = ∅, and y0 be a profile achieving cost µi.
2. Let tw = 2f(yw−1)− yw−1i .
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3. If tw ≥ Li+Ri2 , consider the profile y
w such that
ywj =


xj, if j ∈ Ki;
tw, if j = i;
a, otherwise.
and let ∆w = [max{a, 2f(yw)− tw}, tw]. Otherwise consider yw such that
ywj =


xj, if j ∈ Ki;
tw, if j = i;
b, otherwise.
and let ∆w = [tw,min{2f(yw)− tw, b}].
4. If [Ai, Bi] 6⊆ ∆w, set w = w + 1 and repeat from step 2.
Let us first prove, by induction, that for every w ≥ 0, it holds that ci(y
w
i ,M(y
w)) = µi.
This is clearly true for w = 0. Suppose now that ci(y
w−1
i ,M(y
w−1)) = µi. If t
w ≥ Li+Ri2 , then,
according to Lemma 2, we have that f(yw) = Li 6= y
w
i . Similarly, if t
w < Li+Ri2 , then, according
to Lemma 2, we have that f(yw) = Ri 6= y
w
i . Then, by Claim 1 applied with x = y
w−1, it
holds that ci(y
w
i ,M(y
w)) = µi. In fact, Claim 1 actually proves that for every w ≥ 0, and every
yi ∈ ∆
w, it holds that ci(yi,M(y)) = µi if f(y) 6= yi, and ci(yi,M(y)) ≤ µi otherwise. Hence,
we are only left to prove that there is a w such that ∆w ⊇ [Ai, Bi].
To this aim, we next we prove that for every w ≥ 1, the size of the range ∆w is larger than
the size of the range ∆w−1. This is clearly true for w = 1 since |∆0| = 0 and f(y1) 6= t1, from
which we achieve that |∆1| ≥ 2|f(y1)−t1| > 0. Consider, instead, w > 1. Suppose that ∆w−1 =
[max{a, 2f(yw−1) − tw−1}, tw−1], from which we have that |∆w−1| ≥ 2tw−1 − 2f(yw−1). Note
that this only occurs if tw−1 ≥ Li+Ri2 = Li+
Ri−Li
2 and thus f(y
w−1) = Li, from which it follows
that tw = 2f(yw−1) − tw−1 ≤ Li −
Ri−Li
2 <
Li+Ri
2 . Therefore ∆
w = [tw,min{2f(yw) − tw, b}].
If tw ≥ 2Ri − b, then min{2f(y
w) − tw, b} 6= b, and thus |∆w| = 2f(y
w) − 2tw = 2Ri − 2tw,
otherwise |∆w| = b− t
w ≥ 2Ri − 2tw. Hence, in both cases we achieve that
|∆w| ≥ 2Ri − 2f(y
w−1) + 2tw−1 − 2f(yw−1) = 2tw−1 − 2f(yw−1) + 2|Ri − Li| > |∆
w−1|.
The case for ∆w−1 = [tw−1,min{b, 2f(yw−1)− tw−1}] can be similarly proved.
The lemma then follows since the above procedure eventually considers ∆ ⊇ [Ai, Bi].
Lemma 5. If Li 6= Ri, then for every yi ∈ [Ai, Bi] and every i-compatible profile y such that
f(y) = yi, it holds that ci(yi,M(y)) = µi.
Proof. Suppose that that there is an i-compatible profile y with f(y) = yi and ci(yi,M(y)) <
µi. Consider δ < min{µi − ci(yi,M(y)),max{yi − Ai, Bi − yi}}. According to this choice of
δ, it must exists t ∈ [Ai, Bi] such that d(yi, t) = δ. Moreover, since Li 6= Ri by hypothesis,
either t 6= Li or t 6= Ri. Then, according to Lemma 2, there is a profile y
′ such that y′i = t and
f(y′) 6= y′i. Thus, by Lemma 4, it holds that ci(y
′
i,M(y
′)) = µi.
However, since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on yi and y
′
i. Then,
since M is OSP, it must be the case that
µi = ci(y
′
i,M(y
′)) ≤ ci(y
′
i,M(y)) = max{d(y
′
i, f(y)), d(yi, f(y))} − pi(y)
= d(y′i, yi) + d(yi, f(y)) − pi(y) = δ + ci(yi,M(y)) < µi,
that is absurd.
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Consider now the case that Li = Ri. In this case we let µi = minx : xi=Li ci(xi,M(x)). Next
we prove a lower bound for µi.
Lemma 6. Let y′ be the i-compatible profile such that f(y′) 6= y′i of minimum cost, i.e.,
y′ = argminx : f(x)6=xi ci(xi,M(x)). If Li = Ri, then for every i-compatible profile y such that
yi = Li, it holds that ci(yi,M(y)) ≥ ci(y
′
i,M(y
′))− d(yi, y
′
i).
Proof. Suppose that that there is an i-compatible profile y with yi = Li and ci(yi,M(y)) <
ci(y
′
i,M(y
′))− d(yi, y
′
i). Observe that, since Li = Ri, it must be the case that f(y) = yi.
Since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on yi and y
′
i. Then, since M is
OSP, it must be the case that
ci(y
′
i,M(y
′)) ≤ ci(y
′
i,M(y)) = max{d(y
′
i, f(y)), d(yi, f(y))} − pi(y)
= d(y′i, yi) + d(yi, f(y)) − pi(y) < ci(y
′
i,M(y
′)),
that is absurd.
Lemma 7. For every c > 0, if yi = Ai− c, then for every i-compatible profile y ci(yi,M(y)) ≤
µi + c.
If yi = Bi + c, then for every i-compatible profile y ci(yi,M(y)) ≤ µi + c.
Proof. Consider yi < Ai. and let x be an i-compatible profile with xi = Ai with ci(xi,M(x)) =
µi (it exists by Lemma 5 if Li 6= Ri, and by definition of µi, otherwise). By definition of
Ai, we have that xi = Ai ≤ Li. Then, by Lemma 3, we have that f(x) ≥ xi, and thus
d(yi, f(x)) = d(yi, xi) + d(xi, f(x)) = c+ d(xi, f(x)) > d(xi, f(x)).
However, since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on yi and xi. Then,
since M is OSP, it must be the case that
c(yi, f(y)) ≤ ci(yi,M(x)) = max{d(yi, f(x)), d(xi, f(x))} − pi(x)
= c+ d(xi, f(x))− pi(x) = c+ µi.
The case for yi = Bi + c is similar.
These lemmata fix the payments for i-compatible profiles y such that yi ∈ [Ai, Bi] when
Li 6= Ri. As for the remaining cases, next we show how to choose the minimum payments that
enable the mechanism M to be optimal and OSP with monitoring. In particular, Lemma 8
focuses on profiles y such that yi = Li = Ri. Lemma 9 focuses instead on profiles y with
yi = Ai − c or yi = Bi + c.
Lemma 8. Let y′ be the i-compatible profile such that f(y′) 6= y′i of minimum cost, i.e.,
y′ = argminx : f(x)6=xi ci(xi,M(x)). If there is an i-compatible profile y with yi = Li = Ri
ci(yi,M(y)) > ci(y
′
i,M(y
′)) − d(yi, y
′
i), then there is another direct-revelation optimal OSP
mechanism M′ that for each profile assigns payments at least as small as M and for at least
one profile it assigns a smaller payment.
Proof. Consider M′ = (f,p′) as M except that it sets payments such that c′i(yi,M
′(y)) =
d(yi, f(y))−p
′
i(y) = ci(y
′
i,M(y
′))−d(yi, y
′
i), and for every x
′ such that x′i 6= yi, it sets payments
such that c′i(x
′
i,M
′(x′)) −minx : xi=yi c
′
i(xi,M
′(x)) = ci(x
′
i,M(x
′)) − minx : xi=yi ci(xi,M(x)).
Clearly,M′ is a direct-revelation mechanism. Moreover, since it places the facility in the median
location, it is optimal if it is OSP. Finally, M′ reduces the payment assigned to i at least in the
profile y.
Hence, it is only left to show thatM′ is OSP. Clearly, the OSP condition still holds between
two profiles in which the location of i is different from yi, and when the real location of i is
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exactly yi. Next we show, that if the real location of i is x
′
i 6= yi, then it is not convenient for i
to declare yi. That is, we prove that c
′
i(x
′
i,M
′(x′)) ≤ c′i(x
′
i,M
′(y)) for every x′.
Since Li = Ri, it must be the case that f(y) = yi = Ai = Bi, and then either x
′
i = Ai− c or
x′i = Bi + c, with c > 0. According to Lemma 7, we have that c
′
i(x
′
i,M
′(x′)) − c′i(yi,M
′(y)) =
ci(x
′
i,M(x
′))−minx : xi=yi ci(xi,M(x)) ≤ c. Instead,
c′i(xi,M
′(y)) = max{d(xi, f(y)), d(yi, f(y))} + pi(y) = d(xi, f(y)) − pi(y)
= d(xi, yi) + c
′
i(yi,M
′(y)) = c+ c′i(yi,M
′(y)).
Lemma 9. If there is y with yi = Ai−c, c > 0, and ci(yi,M(y)) < µi+c, then there is another
direct-revelation optimal OSP mechanism M′ that for each profile assigns payments at least as
small as M and for at least one profile it assigns a smaller payment.
Similarly, if there is y with yi = Bi + c and ci(yi,M(y)) < µi + c, then there is another
direct-revelation optimal OSP mechanism M′ that for each profile assigns payments at least as
small as M and for at least one profile it assigns a smaller payment.
Proof. By Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and Lemma 8, we know that ci(yi,M(y)) = µi for every y such
that yi ∈ [Ai, Bi].
Let yAi = maxc>0{yi = Ai − c : ci(yi,M(y)) < µi + c} and y
B
i = minc>0{yi = Bi +
c : ci(yi,M(y)) < µi + c}. Denote as y
∗
i the one closer to the interval [Ai, Bi], i.e. y
∗
i =
argminyi=yAi ,yBi
min{d(Ai, yi), d(Bi, yi)}. Henceforth, we assume w.l.o.g. that y
∗
i = y
A
i . Let
also y∗ = minyˆ : yˆi=y∗i ci(yˆi,M(yˆ)). Observe that, by definition, it must be the case that
ci(y
∗
i ,M(y
∗)) < µi + c
∗, where c∗ = d(y∗i , Ai).
ConsiderM′ = (f,p′) as follows: for every y such that yi ∈ (Ai− c
∗, Bi+ c
∗), set payments
such that c′i(yi,M
′(y)) = d(yi, f(y))+p
′
i(y) = ci(yi,M(y))− (µi+ c
∗− ci(y
∗
i ,M(y
∗)); for every
y such that yi ∈ {y
∗
i , Bi + c
∗}, set payments such that c′i(yi,M
′(y)) = ci(y
∗
i ,M(y
∗)); for every
remaining profile y, set payments such that c′i(yi,M
′(y)) = ci(yi,M(y)).
Clearly, p′i(y) < pi(y) for every y such that yi ∈ (Ai − c
∗, Bi + c
∗), whereas p′i(y) ≤ pi(y)
for every other profile y. Moreover, M′ is a direct-revelation mechanism, and, since it places
the facility in the median location, it is optimal if it is OSP. Hence, it is only left to show that
M′ is OSP.
It is immediate to see that the OSP condition holds if from every profile one moves to
another profile in which the location of i is xi < y
∗
i or xi > Bi + c
∗, and if from a profile in
which the location of i is xi ∈ (Ai − c
∗, Bi + c
∗) one moves to another profile in which the
location of i is yi ∈ (Ai− c
∗, Bi+ c
∗). Next we show that even if the real location of i is xi ≤ y
∗
i
or xi ≥ Bi + c
∗, then it is not convenient for i to declare yi ∈ (Ai − c
∗, Bi + c
∗). That is, we
prove that c′i(xi,M
′(x)) ≤ c′i(xi,M
′(y)) for every x and y such that xi and yi are as above.
To this aim, let µ′i = ci(y
∗
i ,M(y
∗)− c∗. By construction, c′i(xi,M
′(x))µ′i when xi ∈ [Ai, Bi],
c′i(xi,M
′(x)) = µ′i+c when xi = Ai−c or xi = Bi+c, with 0 ≤ c ≤ c
∗, whereas c′i(xi,M
′(x)) ≤
µ′i + c when xi = Ai − c or xi = Bi + c, with c > c
∗. Then, the OSP condition can be proved
as in (4) and (5) with µ′i in place of mi.
In conclusion, a direct-revelation mechanism M that is OSP, optimal and whose payments
cannot be lowered must be exactly as OIM with µi in place of mi. However, suppose w.l.o.g.
that mi = Ri − Ai and consider a profile x such that xi = Ai and f(x) = Ri. According to
Lemma 2, such a profile surely exists. Moreover, as showed above, ci(xi,M(x)) = µi. Therefore,
if all payments are non-positive, then
µi = ci(xi,M(x)) = d(xi, f(x))− pi(x) ≥ d(xi, f(x)) = Ri −Ai = mi.
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Theorem 7 does not rule out the existence of a non-direct-revelation mechanism that is OSP
with lower payments. However, we next show that for every mechanism there is at least one
instance on which it cannot set payments lower than the one assigned by OIM. In particular,
it turns out that for every mechanism there is at least one instance on which at least
⌈
n
2
⌉
− 1
agents incur in a very large cost, namely b− a.
Lemma 10. For every optimal OSP mechanism with monitoring there is an instance of the
facility location problem for which the mechanism sets payments at least as high as OIM.
Proof. Let M = (f,p) be an optimal OSP mechanism and let δ be an arbitrary constant. For
every player i, we define tM(i) as the time in which during the execution of mechanism M
agent i diverges on types a and b − δ. That is, tM(i) is the time step in which M asks agent
i to take an action when her type is a that is different from the action she takes if her type is
b − δ. Note that M may ask to more than one agent to diverge on types a and b − δ at the
same time. Moreover, there may be agents that never diverge on types a and b− δ (for which
we set tM(i) = ∞). However, these are at most
n−1
2 , otherwise M must give the same output
on instance x = (b− δ, . . . , b− δ) and on the instance y such that yj = b− δ if tM(j) <∞, and
yj = a otherwise. But this contradicts the optimality of M.
We now show that for the following instance the payments assigned by M are at least as
high as the payment assigned by OIM. We assume that the number n of agents is odd, and,
without loss of generality, that agents are labeled so that tM(1) ≤ tM(2) ≤ . . . ≤ tM(n). We
consider the instance x according to which the real position of agent i is xi = b− δ if i ≤
n+1
2 ,
and xj = a, otherwise. It is not hard to see that if agents are processed in increasing order of
their label, then OIM on this instance assigns a zero payment to every agent whose real position
is a, and, among agents with real position b−δ, only to the last to be queried. It assigns instead
a payment of b− a to every remaining agent.
We next show that for j ≤ n−12 , it must be the case that M also sets p
M
j (x) ≤ δ − (b− a).
Let indeed t′ be the first step within mechanism M in which j diverges on types b − δ and
b. We set t∗ = min{t′, tM(j)}. Consider then the following instance y: yj = b, yk = b − δ if
tM(k) < t
∗ and k 6= j, and yk = a otherwise. Note that there are at most j − 1 ≤
n−1
2 − 1
agents whose location is b− δ and at least n+12 agents whose location is a. Then, by optimality
of M, we have that f(y) = a. Moreover, since M is OSP, it follows that
d(yj , f(y)) − p
M
j (y) ≤ max{d(yj , f(x)), d(xj , f(x))} − p
M
j (x)
⇒ pMj (x) ≤ δ − (b− a) + p
M
j (y).
Since pMj (y) ≤ 0, the claim then follows by having δ going to 0.
The lemma above does not exclude that an indirect optimal mechanism might set payments
to the agents smaller than OIM’s only for some specific order in which agents are queried.
It is left open to understand if this the case. However, we remark that OIM maintains OSP
irrespectively of such an ordering.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the limitations of OSP mechanisms in terms of the approximation guarantee of
their outputs. By focusing on two paradigmatic problems in the literature, machine scheduling
and facility location, we have shown that OSP can yield a significant loss in the quality of the
solutions returned. We have proposed the use of a novel mechanism design paradigm, namely
monitoring, as a way to reconcile OSP with good approximations. Our positive results show
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how the ingredients needed for truthfulness with monitoring marry up the demands needed for
OSP.
We leave open the problem of understanding the extent to which this parallel holds in
general. Several additional open problems pertain the two case studies considered. For machine
scheduling, it would be interesting to see whether the lower bound can be improved. For facility
location, it is interesting to establish if indirect mechanisms can be more frugal for the agents.
More generally, the mechanisms with monitoring for which we provide an OSP implementation
are shown to be collusion-resistant; is there any way to guarantee OSP (with monitoring)
without relying on coalitional notions of incentive-compatibility? And how hard is it to design
OSP mechanisms that do not use any additional control on agents’ declarations?
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